Atty. Manuel Fernandez won a civil case for his client Florentino Perreyras however, Florentino died without paying Fernandez. Fernandez then assisted the eldest child of Perreyras in a guardianship proceeding so that the eldest may properly dispose of their property in order to pay their father’s indebtedness. Eventually, Florentino’s nipa land was sold for P1,000.00. Thereafter, P200.00 was paid to Atty. Fernandez for his legal services both for Florentino and his heirs. Judge Eloy Bello found out about said payment and so directed Fernandez to explain (because under the guardianship,  proceeds of any sale must first be accounted for and no payment to creditors shall be made without prior authorization from the court).

In the course of the proceeding however, Judge Bello stated that Fernandez does not deserve the P200.00 attorney’s fees because Fernandez is a “below average standard of a lawyer.” Fernandez then responded with strong language (which were not specified).

ISSUE: Whether or not the strong language used by Fernandez against the judge is proper.

HELD: The Supreme Court seem to say yes. The Supreme Court stated that the strong language used by Fernandez must have been impelled by the same language used by Bello in characterizing the act of Fernandez as “anomalous and unbecoming” and in charging him of obtaining his fee “through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner.” If anyone is to blame for the language used by Fernandez, it is Bello himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have provoked Fernandez. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.

On the issue of attorney’s fees, the opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer’s fee. It is the contract between the lawyer and client and the nature of the services rendered.

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In 1953, Atty. Jose Torres sent a telegram to Judge Luis De Leon threatening him that if the judge won’t lift his order of arrest, he shall file criminal, civil and administrative charges against him. Judge De Leon then issued a show cause order requiring Atty. Torres to explain why he should not be disciplined. Torres did not appear but instead he evaded arrest and went to Manila. Judge De Leon then decreed an order suspending Torres from the practice of law until otherwise ruled upon by the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding this order, Torres still practiced law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct of Atty. Torres is proper.

HELD: No. He openly defied a lawful order of the court. It must be impressed upon all lawyers that court orders, even though erroneous, must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system. Torres was suspended for three months.

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Atty. Armando Ampil was the lawyer of Angela Perez. Atty. Ampil won several cases for Angela but the latter was yet to pay Atty. Ampil. As such, Atty. Ampil held on to three certificates of title covering the paraphernal properties of Angela as lien.

Meanwhile, Angela was sued by her husband and son (Antonio Perez and Benigno Perez) due to the fact that she had been indiscriminately dispensing her paraphernal properties in favor of a lover in an illicit relationship. Said case was filed in the sala of Judge Corazon Juliano-Agrava. Atty. Ampil did not represent Angela in this case.

Angela and Antonio and Benigno eventually came into an amicable settlement and they submitted a Compromise Agreement whereby Angela agreed to convey her paraphernal properties to Antonio and Benigno. The agreement was approved by the Court.

Antonio and Benigno tried to obtain the certificates of title from Atty. Ampil in view of the court-approved agreement but Atty. Ampil refused to turn over said titles as he has a lien over them. Antonio and Benigno then moved for execution against Atty. Ampil and the same was granted by the Court. Judge Agrava ruled that the attorney’s lien claimed by Atty. Ampil must be enforced by Atty. Ampil against Angela and not against Antonio and Benigno.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ampil has a right over the properties of Angela.

HELD: Yes. A counsel’s right to retain muniments of title in his possession until payment of his lawful fees and disbursements is effected is incontestable. An attorney cannot be compelled to surrender the muniments of title without prior proof that his fees have been duly satisfied.

It would also not matter that Angela’s properties were conveyed via the compromise agreement to Antonio and Benigno. Atty. Ampil’s lien came first. Thus, his position is similar to that of a creditor who holds an attachment lien over the properties and the client-debtor must discharge the lien before he can dispose the properties to a third person free of such lien.

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B.M. No. 914 – 316 SCRA 1 – Legal Ethics – The Legal Profession – Admission to the Bar – Citizenship Requirement – Only Filipinos may be admitted to the Philippine Bar

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Ching was born in 1964. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution, which was in effect when Ching was born, was treated as follows:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 

Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.

The Solicitor-General averred that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).

Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court explained that the original interpretation of electing Philippine citizenship “upon reaching the age of majority” was that the person concerned must make the election within a reasonable time upon reaching the age of majority. In one case, “reasonable time” was construed to be three years but may be extended depending on the circumstances such as if one had always considered himself or herself a Filipino all his/her life. Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered however. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship. He only elected Philippine citizenship in 1999 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

SIDE ISSUE: But the 1935 Constitution was superseded by the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions which expressly provided that Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines are also citizens of the Philippines. Did not that make Ching a Filipino citizen because his mother was a Filipino?

HELD: No. Firstly, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.

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G.R. No. L-53869 – 113 SCRA 39 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Appearance in Court by a Congressman

Legal Ethics – A Congressman may not appear as counsel in court

This case is a consolidation of two cases, the other being Eugenio Puyat et al vs Sixto De Guzman (G.R. No. L-51928) involving the issue of whether or not a member of Congress may appear before the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.

Case 1

In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. The presiding judge however overruled Villegas’ challenge and proceeded with the trial. The judge said that CFIs have appellate jurisdiction.

Case 2

In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas, a corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel for the corporation. Reyes questions the appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is also a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang Pambansa may appear as counsels before the said CFIs.

HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel before CFIs acting in their original jurisdiction. CFIs have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as a courts of general original jurisdiction. Both cases were not elevated to the said CFIs from any lower courts. Thus, the CFIs in the case at bar are “courts without appellate jurisdiction”.

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NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative agencies, are included. (From https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/terms.asp, accessed 09/17/2014)

G.R. No. L-51122 – 113 SCRA 31 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Appearance in Court

Legal Ethics – A member of Congress may not appear as counsel in quasi-judicial bodies

In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI). The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted. Thereafter, Acero filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner (Sixto De Guzman, Jr.) granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?

HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

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NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative agencies, are included. (From https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/terms.asp, accessed 09/17/2014)

Michael Medado passed the 1979 bar exams. He took his oath but was not able to attend his scheduled roll signing because he misplaced his notice. Years passed and he forgot about the signing. In fact, for a while he thought that he signed the roll but it was too late when he realized that what he could have signed was just an attendance sheet at the PICC. Nevertheless, he held positions at the Laurel Law Office and other prestigious companies.

In 2012, he finally filed a petition to be allowed to sign the roll. The Office of the Bar Confidant actually denied his petition on the ground that Medado could not offer a satisfactory explanation why he neglected signing the roll.

ISSUE: Whether or not to allow Medado to sign the Roll.

HELD: Yes. Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar. The SC still considered good faith on the part of Medado.

However, since he has been practicing law since the 1980s, the SC decided to impose a penalty akin to suspension. And that suspension is by way delaying further Medado’s signing of the roll by one year from his receipt of the Resolution (B.M. No. 2540). He was likewise fined the amount of Php32,000.00 and was sternly warned that he will be dealt with severely if he shall practice law prior to signing the Roll of Attorney.

The SC emphasized that the practice of law is reserved to the members of the bar in good standing and the final act for one to be a member of the bar is the signing of the Roll.

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Note: For those wondering, yes Atty. Medado was able to sign the Roll.

Daniel Liangco was a judge in San Fernando, Pampanga. He was dismissed from the bench in 2000 for various infractions. The Supreme Court further directed the Office of the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment proceedings against Liangco.

Liangco was removed as a judge because he acted on a Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the local government of San Fernando, Pampanga without notifying the other party (a certain Hermogenes Gozun). Gozun’s house was demolished by the strength of Liangco’s decision. As a result, he filed an administrative case against Liangco.

During the investigation of the IBP, the other infractions of Liangco was discovered. He was once entrapped by the NBI for extortion. One of his witnesses, a local government official, even admitted that they used to go to his office in order to discuss on some cases pending before Liangco’s court.

The IBP recommended Liangco’s disbarment. Liangco filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to question the recommendation of the IBP. He averred among others that the IBP used the same evidence against him which were used in the proceedings which led to his removal from the bench and that he was not able to actively participate in the IBP proceedings. Liangco also averred that Gozun withdrew his case against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Liangco should be disbarred.

HELD: Yes. Membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the latter’s moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyer’s oath. Only those who are “competent, honorable, and reliable” may practice the profession of law for every lawyer must pursue “only the highest standards in the practice of his calling”.

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of complainant unimportant and of little relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice – an issue which the complainant’s personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, upon information of an alleged wrongdoing, the Court may initiate the disbarment proceedings motu proprio.

But Liangco was already removed as member of the bench for the same infractions, is it still proper to disbar him?

Yes. Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant – do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.

The Court also notes that Liangco’s Petition for Review on Certiorari is an improper remedy in disbarment cases.

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Judge Romeo Atillo, Jr. maintains a Facebook profile page. He posted pictures of him where he was half-naked revealing tattoos on his torso. Apparently, this did not sit well with someone who was able to view the pictures and that someone sent an anonymous complaint against Judge Atillo to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).

The OCA conducted an investigation. Judge Atillo explained that the privacy settings of his posts were “friends only” which means that his posts were meant to be viewed not by the public but only by him and his friends. He explained that someone hacked his Facebook account and changed the privacy settings of his posts to “public”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Atillo acted with impropriety.

HELD: Yes. If the posts were made by an ordinary citizen, there would have been nothing wrong about it. But, Judge Atillo, as a judge, has to strictly comply with the exacting standards required of a judge.

The Supreme Court adopted the findings of the OCA that the pictures posted by Judge Atillo create an altogether different impression on the viewers and somehow would make a layman question the fitness of Judge Atillo as a judge. These negative impressions of the public in general are what taint Judge Atillo’s propriety as a judge.

Judges must always conduct themselves irreproachably and in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty, and uprightness, not only in the discharge of duties but also in their personal lives. As the visible personification of law and justice, judges are held to higher standards of conduct.

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Nelson Lai was convicted of murder. He filed a motion for reconsideration where he raised the issue of denial of due process because the judge who decided the case, Judge Fernando Elumba, when he was a prosecutor appeared as public prosecutor in the same case which Lai was convicted in. The case reached the Supreme Court.

Elumba explained that he only entered his appearance as prosecutor in the case when the prosecution already rested its case; he was not the one who actively prosecuted the case. In fact, he only appeared during the presentation of the last witness for the defense and it was not even him who cross-examined the witness as there was a private prosecutor who conducted the trial; that at any rate, Lai should have sought his disqualification prior to the rendition of the judgment of conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not a prosecutor who was appointed to the bench may decide a case in which he entered appearance as prosecutor.

HELD: No. His disqualification in the case as judge is mandatory as per the Rules:

Section 1 [RULE 137]. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

Also, Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands the disqualification of a judge who has previously served as a lawyer of any of the parties, to wit:

Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to instances where:

x x x x

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein; x x x.

The SC reiterates, ‘the cold neutrality of an impartial judge‘ is an indispensable imperative of due process.

It does not matter that Elumba’s degree of participation as a prosecutor was only passive. The purpose of this stricture is to ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect the life, liberty and property of an accused should be conducted and determined by a judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.

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A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC – Mercantile Law – Intellectual Property Law – Copyright – Plagiarism

Legal Ethics – Judicial Ethics – Integrity

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books to support the assailed decision. These books were:

a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);

b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and

c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).

As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.

Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.

HELD: No. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.

No Plagiarism

According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”

This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.

But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.

On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical explanations.

On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately

According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as background facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.

No Misconduct

Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or corruption.

No Inexcusable Negligence

The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and 4^th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every sense, the justice is in control in the writing of the draft.

Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno dissenting

There is such a thing as judicial plagiarism. And though judicial plagiarism does not necessarily carry with them the imposition of sanctions nor does it mean that a case should undergo retrial based on it, the existence of which should be acknowledged.

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A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC – 642 SCRA 11 – Legal Ethics – Duty of Counsel To Cite Law/Jurisprudence Without Alteration

Mercantile Law – Intellectual Property Law – Copyright – Plagiarism – Attribution

The Malaya Lolas received an adverse decision in the case Vinuya vs Romulo decided by the Supreme Court on April 28, 2010. The Malaya Lolas sought the annulment of said decision due to the alleged irregularity in the writing of the text of the decision. Allegedly, the ponente of said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo copied verbatim portions of the decision laid down in said case from three works by three foreign authors without acknowledging said authors hence an overt act of plagiarism which is highly reprehensible.

Plagiarism as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”

In 2010, the Supreme Court already ruled that plagiarism does not apply in decisions promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Malaya Lolas moved for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not plagiarism is applicable to decisions promulgated by the Supreme Court.

HELD: No. It has been a long standing practice in this jurisdiction not to cite or acknowledge the originators of passages and views found in the Supreme Court’s decisions. These omissions are true for many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the judiciary’s more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.

As put by one author (this time acknowledged by the Court), Joyce C. George from her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:

A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.

Further, the omission of the acknowledgment by Justice del Castillo of the three foreign authors arose from a clerical error. It was shown before the Supreme Court that the researcher who finalized the draft written by Justice del Castillo accidentally deleted the citations/acknowledgements; that in all, there is still an intent to acknowledge and not take such passages as that of Justice del Castillo’s own.

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Rana defended himself by saying that he did not appear as a lawyer for the politician but he merely appeared as “a person who knows the law”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rana engaged in unauthorized practice of law.

HELD: Yes. It appears that Rana, while a bar passer but has not yet taken his oath and has not yet signed the Roll of Attorneys, entered his appearance as counsel in the election case for the local politician, he submitted a pleading as counsel, has signed the pleading as counsel, and his legal services has been retained by his client. Clearly, Rana engaged in the practice of law without taking the lawyer’s oath and without signing the Roll. Rana was denied admission to the bar.

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NOTE: Rana was only admitted to the bar in December 2008.

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Justice Ruben Reyes was the original ponente of G.R. Nos. 178831-32, G.R. No. 179120, G.R. Nos. 179132-33, and G.R. Nos. 179240-41. These cases were consolidated. These cases sought the disqualification of Jocelyn Limkaichong as candidate for a congressional seat for Negros Oriental. Limkaichong was disqualified but she was already proclaimed and had already assumed office as a member of Congress. Hence, the issue on who has jurisdiction on her qualifications was elevated to the Supreme Court.

In July 2008, the Supreme Court en banc deliberated on the ponencia of Justice Reyes. His draft was adverse to Limkaichong. After the deliberation, seven out of thirteen justices signified that they are concurring in the result. Later, two more justices manifested the same. Nevertheless, the Justices agreed to hold further deliberations in order for their decision to have doctrinal value. The Justices assessed that the case is of significant importance considering that an elected member of Congress (Limkaichong) is to be removed: “any decision ousting a sitting member of the House of Representatives should spell out clearly the legal basis relied upon by the majority for such extreme measure.”

Now in December 2008, Louis Biraogo, one of those who protested against Limkaichong, held a press conference and he accused the Supreme Court of unduly withholding the promulgation of the decision against Limkaichong. Biraogo presented a photocopy of the draft made by Justice Reyes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the leakage of the decision is proper.

HELD: No. The unpromulgated decision is a confidential matter.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that confidential information acquired by justices and judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel likewise devotes one whole canon on confidentiality, to wit:

SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential information acquired by them while employed in the judiciary, whether such information came from authorized or unauthorized sources.

Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers.

The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order shall remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made public.

After investigation, the Supreme Court found that it was Justice Reyes himself who caused the leakage. The peculiar features of the draft copy that he has is the same as the features seen in the photocopy presented by Biraogo to the media. Justice Reyes was found guilty of Grave Misconduct and was fined Php500k. He was also directed to explain why he should not be disbarred.

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NOTE: Justice Reyes retired on 02 January 2009 (before promulgation of this case which was 24 February 2009). The Limkaichong case was finally promulgated on 01 April 2009. The ponente was Justice Diosdado Peralta. The promulgated decision was favorable to Limkaichong.

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In January 2019, Atty. Berteni Causing posted on his Facebook account a draft of a plunder complaint which he intended to file against Jackiya Lao. Lao was a candidate in the 2019 elections (congressional seat). The post painted Lao as a corrupt politician and the post subjected Lao to public ridicule.

Lao then filed a disbarment case against Causing. In his defense, Causing averred that his post was covered by free speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press (because he is a vlogger) and that he eventually filed the plunder case against Lao.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Causing should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes. Atty. Causing’s defense is not tenable. As a member of the Bar, Atty. Causing ought to know that Facebook, or any other social medium, for that matter, is not the proper forum to air out his grievances, for a lawyer who uses extra-legal fora, is a lawyer who weakens the rule of law. In this case, Atty. Causing knew that the proper forum for his complaint is the Office of the Ombudsman.

The fact that Atty. Causing subsequently filed the complaint for Plunder before the Office of the Ombudsman is of no moment as the damage to the reputation of Lao had already been done.

Rule 8.01 of the CPR provides: A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Since this is already Atty. Causing’s second offense of similar nature, the Supreme Court disbarred him.

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In November 2013, several individuals went to the law office of Atty. Jonathan Tambol bringing with them affidavits for notarization. In the affidavits for notarization, there appeared to be nine affiants but only seven affiants appeared in person before Atty. Tambol. Atty. Tambol then told the present affiants that he will notarize the affidavits despite the absence of the two affiants provided that the two absent affiants (Roland Guibong and Alberto Factora) shall submit copies of their identification cards. This was complied with hence the affidavits were notarized.

The affidavits were complaints against Atty. Rene Baysa. Later, Atty. Baysa filed a disbarment case against Atty. Tambol for notarizing documents despite the non-appearance of the affiants.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tambol violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

HELD: Yes. Atty. Tambol tried to justify his act by claiming that Guibong and Factora submitted valid identification cards together with their affidavits. According to Atty. Tambol, this proved that they intended their affidavits to be notarized by him even in their absence. The Court disagrees. The prohibition is clear. A notary public cannot perform a notarial act without the two requisites: (1) personal presence of the signatory to the instrument or document; and (2) the signatory is personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. Guibong and Factora’s mere submission of valid identification cards to Atty. Tambol as competent evidence of identity is not enough. Both should have been personally present before Atty. Tambol to have their affidavits notarized.

Time and again, the Court has stressed that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of the statements therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act or deed.

The notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private documnent into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A. notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknov1ledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

Atty. Tambol is reprimanded and was issued a stern warning. His notarial commission was revoked and was disqualified to apply for a notarial commission for two years.

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In 1998, two criminal cases were filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabua-Bato, Camarines Sur, presided by Judge Salvador Occiano. The public prosecutor filed a motion for the issuance of a hold-departure order (HDO) against the accused in the criminal cases. Judge Occiano granted the motion. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation received a copy of the HDO but they referred it to the Department of Justice. The DOJ referred the HDO to the Office of the Court Administrator as the DOJ was aware that hold-departure orders may be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Occiano is guilty of grave misconduct.

HELD: Yes. OCA Circular No. 39-97 clearly states that hold-departure orders may be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. MTCs, MeTCs, MTCCs, and MCTCs are not authorized to issue HDOs. Judge Occiano knows this yet he chose to issue the HDO nonetheless. He is aware of OCA Circ. No. 39-97 yet he chose to ignore it. This was clear from his explanation that he believes that the issuance of a HDO is an inherent power of the court.

Judge Occiano cannot take refuge behind his alleged zeal for the early termination of the criminal cases in question. Against the demands of sheer speed in disposing of cases, judges should be reminded that their mission above all is to see that justice is done. Judge Occiano issued the hold-departure order without authority. It was a clear case of a violation of the accused’s right and liberty to travel. The very essence of Circular No. 39-97 is to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of hold-departure orders resulting in inconvenience to the parties affected which is tantamount to an infringement on their right and liberty to travel.

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In 1918, Atty. Marcelino Lontok was convicted of bigamy. Bigamy is a crime involving moral turpitude. In 1921, Lontok was pardoned by the Governor-General.

The Attorney-General, however, sought for the disbarment of Atty. Lontok on the ground that a member of the bar may be suspended or removed if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Atty. Lontok argued that the pardon granted to him operates to blot out all the effects of the conviction. On this the Attorney-General contended that while the pardon removes the legal infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lontok, despite the pardon he received, must be disbarred.

HELD: No. Prior to this case, there were conflicting decisions on the effect of pardon as to the Court’s right to discipline a lawyer. In the 1915 case of In Re: Emmons, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. While in the 1907 case of People vs. Burton, it was held that where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceedings, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law. There was also the 1866 case of Ex parte Garland where it was ruled that an absolute pardon “does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interest vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment.”

In this case, the Supreme Court considered the fact that the sole basis of the disbarment proceedings was the fact that Atty. Lontok was convicted of bigamy for which he was absolutely pardoned. The SC also considered the fact that one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability is by way of pardon.

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Atty. Isidro Vinzon and his wife were convicted of estafa. The Solicitor General received information of Vinzon’s conviction and he initiated a disbarment case against Vinzon.

Vinzon averred that the estafa case does not bind the Supreme Court and that there were errors in his conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vinzon should be disbarred.

HELD: Yes. His conviction already became final and executory. His averments have no basis.

There can be no question that the term “moral turpitude” includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals.

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A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC – 613 Phil. 1 – 596 SCRA 378 – Legal Ethics – Judicial Ethics – Government Lawyers, Generally, Cannot Engage in Private Practice of Law; Prohibition has limited application even after separation from service

In February 2008, Atty. Karen Silverio-Buffe resigned as the Clerk of Court of RTC 81, Romblon. She immediately engaged in private practice of law and even appeared in three cases before her former office (RTC 81).

Apparently, she received a complaint about her appearances in RTC 81 because under the law, she is prohibited from appearing in RTC 81 within one year from her separation from that office or until February 2009. The pertinent law provides:

Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)

SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

x x x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

x x x

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

Atty. Silverio-Buffe filed two petitions for declaratory relief questioning Sec. 7(b)(2), RA 6713 but her petitions were denied. She now submitted a letter query to the Supreme Court questioning the law.

Atty. Silverio-Buffe argues that the provision is unfair because, in effect, it allows incumbents to practice law while non-incumbents like her are prohibited. She advances the position that the prohibition should be understood to mean that: she could handle pending cases in RTC 81 “so long as her appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Silverio-Buffe is correct.

HELD: No. She misread the law. Under Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713, incumbents, in this case private lawyers or specifically in her case employee-lawyers of the judiciary, are allowed to engage in private practice provided the constitution or the law does not prohibit them. There is however a law that prohibits incumbent lawyers of the judiciary from engaging in law practice which is Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. Thus, court lawyers are actually prohibited from engaging in private practice of law or any practice outside their office. This prohibition promotes the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.

On the other hand, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 allows non-incumbents to practice law. Thus, when she resigned, Atty. Silverio-Buffe is allowed to practice law. The only prohibition is that she cannot appear as counsel before RTC 81 until February 2009 (or for one year from separation). This prohibition is anchored on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors.

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